Rekonstruksi Epistemologi Ilmu Hukum melalui Pendekatan Filsafat Ilmu

Abstract

The science of law still grapples with fundamental epistemological questions: whether it is a science that stands alone (sui generis) or only obtains scientific status through methodological borrowing from other disciplines. This debate touches on the core of how legal truth is constructed, verified, and accounted for, but it is rarely accompanied by explicit reflection on the underlying epistemological assumptions. This research aims to reconstruct the epistemological foundations of law through a philosophical perspective of science, identify the assumptions underlying various paradigms, analyze their limitations, and formulate an alternative framework that is inclusive of normative and empirical dimensions. This research is a normative-philosophical legal research with a descriptive-analytical and prescriptive qualitative approach. Primary data sources include philosophical and theoretical texts from Kelsen, Hart, Fuller, Holmes, Kuhn, and Toulmin, as well as academic documents in the form of legal education curriculum and legal research guidelines. Secondary data sources include philosophy of science textbooks, reputable journal articles indexed by Sinta 2 and Scopus, dissertations, and relevant research reports. Data collection was carried out through systematic literature studies, document analysis, and literature search on reputable journal databases. Data analysis used a philosophical-critical model through argument reconstruction, assumption deconstruction, and alternative reconstruction, combined with Miles, Huberman, and Saldaña's interactive analysis models. The validity of the data was ensured through source triangulation, peer debriefing, trail audits, and transparent documentation. The results of the study showed three main findings. First, the epistemological structure of law is formed in the dynamic tension between normative positivism and empirical realism. Second, Kuhn's framework cannot be applied mechanically because law is characterized by a plurality of paradigms, gradual shifts, and incomprehensible interpretive traditions. Third, alternative epistemological reconstruction can be built on the rejection of the sein-solen dichotomy, the recognition of the interpretive nature of legal knowledge, and the emphasis on pragmatic aspects that can be accounted for.